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21 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Net Evaluation Studies of Soviet and U.S.  
Strategic Strike Forces

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1. This memorandum is a response to questions you raised during  recent briefing concerning the availability within CIA of various net evaluation studies on US and Soviet military forces. It represents the views of the interested components in the DD/I and DD/S&T. Paragraph 5 outlines action that is underway to assure continuing access to relevant DOD studies.

2. Throughout most of the 1950's and until 1963 the Net Evaluation Sub-Committee (NESC) of the National Security Council annually examined the comparative force levels of the US and USSR, and the probable results of a strategic exchange between them. Both the Chairman of the JCS and the Director of Central Intelligence were members of the NESC. Studies of this sort by the NESC ceased in 1963 and the Sub-Committee was disbanded in early 1965. For the past two years the problems of a strategic exchange have been

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handled primarily by the military services at the behest of the Secretary of Defense. These studies usually involve the effect of proposed new weapons on the balance of US and Soviet forces. Such evaluations are formally reflected in the Presidential Memoranda setting forth the annual recommendations of the Secretary of Defense.

3. Some of the studies alluded to above, particularly those related to new weapons developments, are of use to the intelligence analyst and they are available to the Agency through a number of channels, both formal and informal. Since most of the studies are of a very specific nature, however, the existence of a study and its applicability to intelligence problems is most often revealed through personal liason at various operating levels among CIA, DOD, and DIA. <sup>Once to mention,</sup> There generally is very little trouble obtaining copies of the finished product. Moreover, many related studies for the DOD by outside consultant firms, such as Rand, are received routinely in the Agency.

4. Within CIA, the principal users of these studies and memoranda are ONE and the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group (JAG). While the close relationship of these components to the military services and the DOD appears to keep them well-apprised of weapons studies having an intelligence application, there is no formal way to assure awareness and access on our part to all

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studies pertinent to intelligence evaluations. Ideally, it would be desirable to have a periodic listing of studies underway within DOD and the services so that we may determine those which, in our judgment, are pertinent to intelligence studies.

5. Because of its mission and method of operation, the JAG is in the best position to determine whether or not a list exists or could be prepared, and to develop more systematic arrangements for assuring availability of military studies and information on weapons programs. Chief, JAG has been asked to discuss these matters with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. You will be informed of the results of these discussions at a later date, and of any further action on your part that may seem necessary or appropriate.

WILLIAM N. MORELL, JR.  
Director  
Research and Reports

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<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE 1/ '66
To: Dr. Albert Wheelon		
ROOM NO. 6 E 60	BUILDING Headquarters	
REMARKS:  I have discussed all of your points with [ ] of JAG and with [ ] [ ] They understand them and are aware of the Director's concern. I think further action at this time should await the results of Bob's discussions at OSD.		
FROM: [ ]		
ROOM NO. 3 F 23	BUILDING Headquarters	EXTENSION 6915

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FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO : 1967--O--439445

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Wheelon

1. I gave [ ] of JAG a copy of your comments as he had arranged with you. [ ] tells me he is looking into the matter of lists as reflected in Para 5 of the re-draft prepared by [ ] for Morell's signature.

2. I believe Para 4 and 5 reflect the comments you wished to have incorporated into the first draft, which is being sent to the DCI.

3. If it is agreeable with you, I will tell [ ] that DD/S&T concurs.

*OK AS NOTED*

21 Jan 66  
(DATE)

*Advised*

*by phone w/ additional*  
*phone on para 3. (one)*

FORM NO.  
1 AUG 54

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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Subject: Net Evaluation Studies of Soviet and U.S. Strategic  
Strike Forces

1. This memorandum answers your questions concerning the availability within CIA of various net evaluation studies on US and Soviet military forces. It represents the views of components in the DD/I and DD/S&T directorates.

2. Throughout most of the 1950's and until 1963 the Net Evaluation Sub-Committee (NESC) of the National Security Council annually examined the comparative force levels of the US and USSR, and the results of a strategic exchange between them. Both the Chairman of the JCS and the Director of Central Intelligence were members of the NESC and its evaluations were available to CIA routinely. Studies of this sort by the NESC ceased in 1963 and the Sub-committee was disbanded in early 1965. For the past two years the problems of a strategic exchange have been handled primarily by the military services at the behest of the Secretary of Defense. These studies usually involve the effect of proposed new U.S. offensive or defensive weapons on the balance of U.S. and Soviet forces. Such evaluations are formally reflected in the Presidential Memoranda setting forth the annual recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, of course, more specific studies and war

games are continually carried out by SAC, NORAD and the Joint Strategic Targeting Agency at Omaha.

3. Some of the studies alluded to above, particularly those related to new weapons developments, are of use to the intelligence analyst and they are available to the Agency through a number of channels -- some routine, some personal. Since most of the studies are of a very specific nature, existence of a study and its applicability to intelligence problems is most often revealed through personal liaison at various operating levels among CIA, DOD and DIA. There generally is very little trouble obtaining copies of the finished studies. Moreover, many related studies for the DOD by outside consultant firms such as Rand and Stanford Research Institute find their way routinely into the Agency.

4. The most likely point of contact for DOD studies within CIA is the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group (JAG), whose mission is long range alternative projections of Soviet military forces. The JAG is jointly staffed by the Agency and members of the three military services assigned to DIA, with CIA membership drawn from components of the DD/S&T and DD/I. Their method of operation calls for continuous contact with DOD and service personnel engaged in studies of U.S. weapons development, utilization and comparative effectiveness.



On the other hand, policy reflections of DOD studies in the form of Presidential Memoranda, are more liable to come to the attention of the Office of National Estimates which has a working relationship with DOD components for appraisals of comparative military forces and strategies. In the normal course of operations with the JAG and ONE, intelligence producers throughout the Agency are generally kept aware of the interests, problems and assumptions on the part of U.S. planners that might serve to improve the utility of the Agency's product.

5. On balance, it appears that net evaluation studies of the type that are most useful to the intelligence process are available to CIA in a timely fashion. Because the informal exchange of information satisfies the needs of those most intimately engaged in aspects of the net evaluation problem, no specific action appears necessary at this time.



DATE: 17 Jan 88



*Office of the DD/S&T*

TO: Dr. Wheelon

Thru: Executive Officer/DDS&T *hy*

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

1. The attached memorandum has been prepared by  DDI/ORR, whose briefing at the DCI Morning Meeting recently prompted the Director to raise the question of availability to CIA of net evaluation studies.

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2. I understand that you gave the action to Don Chamberlain who coordinated this response as representative of the views of OSI and FMSAC. Are these views compatible with those which were expressed at the DCI Meeting? If so, I will return the paper to OSI and indicate DD/S&T concurrence.

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Attachment



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20 January 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Net Evaluation Studies of Soviet  
and U. S. Strategic Strike Forces

*and CCR*  
1. This document is as useful as a recapitulation of the way in which the NSC used to work to effect coordination between DOD. It also shows the way in which the responsibility for net evaluations has shifted to the Secretary of Defense.

2. I believe that it is overly optimistic with respect to the DOD information which is available to CIA and tends to sweep this access problem under a rug of personal relationships and reports from DOD proprietaries. The blunt fact is that we in CIA do not know what DOD documents are available and have no way of requesting such information on a routine basis. We have no assurance that the relevant information on DOD programs and war plans is available to us in the way that all national intelligence estimates and current intelligence is supplied to the DOD. Perhaps this is the way that Government ought to work, but I believe that we are misleading the Director seriously by suggesting that things are in apple pie order.

3. Please modify this document to reflect these views.

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ALBERT D. WHEELON  
Deputy Director  
for

Science and Technology

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